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Abstract: Based upon documents from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Archive of the 
PHRSOH·VRepublic of China, this manuscript reconsiders the impact of an important event in 
Cold War history and in the history of anti-Japanese nationalism in China: the Soviet-
sponsored Khabarovsk trials of December 1949.  In trying twelve members of the Japanese 
military who had been associated with Ishii Shiro and the bacteriological weapons (BW) 
UHVHDUFKRIKLV´Unit 731,µ the Soviet Union wielded a potent instrument in shaping anti-
Japanese discourse in the new China.  Having had little foreknowledge of the trials and no 
international representation in other previous forums regarding Japanese war crimes, the 
newly ascendant Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was therefore obliged to trumpet the 
dangers of Japanese BW research and the wisdom of the Khabarovsk trials in preventing an 
American-sponsored return to Japanese militarism.  The propaganda was clearly intended to 
smooth over the public acceptance in China of the incipient Sino-Soviet alliance, showing 
again the malleability of the anti-Japanese idea and the various means and motivations by 
which it was deployed by the CCP in the postwar years.  The trials also presented a 
multiplicity of new bureaucracies in Beijing with an opportunity to accelerate the collection 
of evidence of Japanese war crimes on the mainland, indicating the specific evolution of war 
memory in the Chinese visualization of postwar Japan.  This ongoing mobilization by the 
CCP indicates the extent to which the Chinese people saw their victimization at Japanese 
KDQGVDVQRWKDYLQJVWULFWO\EHHQFRPSOHWHGZLWK-DSDQ·VVXrrender.  Having been aroused by 
a Soviet propaganda ploy, legitimate Chinese concerns over bacteriological weapons grew 
with great rapidity in spring 1950, resulting in an intense anti-Japanese mobilization of both 
party and people that was ultimately swept up into the Korean War.   
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 Introduction 
 Japanese soldiers and scientists perpetrated horrific war crimes across Asia from 
1931-1945, but the investigation of, and trials for, these crimes occurred almost wholly 
within the politically-charged environment of the Cold War.1  Just as Cold War tensions 
colored the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, ideological competition deeply inflected the 
manner of Allied prosecution of Japanese war crimes.2  As victorious parties in the World 
War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and two divergent Chinese regimes each brought 
its own particular political needs to the postwar war crimes trials of Japanese defendants.  
Having swaggered into Tokyo·VIHZXQGHVWUR\HGEXLOGLQJV in September 1945, the American 
occupation regime used war crimes trials to convince the Japanese people (and their 
American counterparts) that only a small clique of militarists had been responsible for the 
wartime cataclysm, absenting Emperor Hirohito from any culpability.3  As the United States 
established itself at the pinnacle of Allied power on the Japanese archipelago, the Soviet 
military command swept hundreds of thousands of Kwantung Army officers and soldiers 
northward and out of Manchuria from 1945-1946, using their labor but also hoarding the 
                                                 
1 Richard Minear, 9LFWRU·V-XVWLFH.  Recent scholarship on Japanese war crimes is represented by Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi, The Nanking Atrocity (Berghahn Press, 2007) and Joshua Fogel, The Rape of Nanking,.   
 
2 Norman J.W. Goda, Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007);  Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 
3 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito (Harvard University Press, 2000); John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of 
World War II, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co./New Press, 1999).. 
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highest-ranking men to be tried at a more convenient time.4  ,QWKHDIWHUPDWKRI-DSDQ·V
surrender, most large trials of Japanese war criminals remained squarely in the hands of the 
two big powers.  Even after the Soviet Union suddenly transferred 971 of these Japanese 
POWs into Chinese communist custody in July 1950, the PRC government would take more 
than six years to embark upon independent trials of Japanese war criminals  These 1956 trials 
held in Shenyang and Taiyuan served a distinctly different purpose than prior attempts to 
secure justice for Japanese war crimes, but were intended to influence multiple foreign 
audiences.5  In every case, Japanese war criminals, though their crimes had occurred long 
before 1945, cast shadows into the Cold War and played a key role in the ideological 
propaganda battles that followed.  War crimes trials of the Japanese, potentially a significant 
means of rectifying the wrongs of the past World War, were deeply politicized and brought 
little closure to the previous conflict.    
                                                 
4 William F. Nimmo, Behind a Curtain of Silence: Japanese in Soviet Custody, 1945-1956 (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1988); see also interviews compiled by 7KRPDV6WDUN´6RYLHW8VHDQG7UHDWPHQWRI
-DSDQHVH3V:µ'RXJODV0DF$UWKXU0HPRULDO$UFKLYH0LFURILOP5ROO.   
 
5 Fushun Zhanfan Guanlisuo (Fushun War Criminals Management Center), eds., Riben Zhanfan de Zai Sheng 
Zhidi (Place of New Life of Japanese War Criminals),(Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo Chubanshe, 2005); Adam 
&DWKFDUWDQG3DWULFLD1DVK´War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the 
Shenyang Trials, 1954-1956µTwentieth-Century China (April 2009); 7DNHVKL<RVKLGD´Brainwashing or 
5HIOHFWLRQ"7KH(PHUJHQFHDQG'HYHORSPHQWRI:DU*XLOWDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\LQ3RVWZDU-DSDQµ
unpublished manuscript.       
. 
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 Because the postwar trials were so thoroughly saturated with international politics, 
the issue of bacteriological weapons (BW) crimes remained one of the most controversial 
and powerful issues of the early Cold War in Asia.6  While the issue was overtly trumpeted 
across the socialist lands, Allied leaders and propagandists sought to tamp down speculation 
about the legacies of Japanese BW.  Bacteriological war crimes therefore represented a highly 
sensitive and multifaceted postwar problem resistant to any simple solution.  Physically, the 
´IDFWRULHVRIGHDWKµwere only partially destroyed in 1945 and continued looming outside of 
Harbin; bacteria and subsequent recurrent plague lingered in Northeast China and Zhejiang 
SURYLQFHDQG,VKLL6KLURZKRVHUHVHDUFKDVKHDGRI´8QLWµRIthe Japanese Kwantung 
Army had made these things possible, was living in Japan evading prosecution.  For General 
Douglas MacArthur and the American occupation in Tokyo, the opportunity to learn the 
results of Japanese experiments on living subjects in Manchuria, and the fear that the Soviets 
would acquire the results, was worth the price of protecting Ishii from prosecution.7  The 
Soviets managed to interview Ishii in Tokyo in 1947, but their main points of contact with 
                                                 
6 Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death, Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945 (New York: Routeldge, 2002); David 
Williams and Peter Wallace, 8QLW7KH-DSDQHVH$UP\·V6HFUHWRI6HFUHWV, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1989); Hal Gold, ed.  Unit 731 Testimony (North Clarendon:  Tuttle Publishing, 1996), pp. 221-222. 
 
7 Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death, Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945 (New York: Routeldge, 2002); GHQ 
Far East Command Check Sheet, Note from G-2 to the Legal Section, 17 April 1947, R.G. 331, Box 1434, 20, 
Case 330, U.S. National Archives; GHQ Far East Command Check Sheet, Note from G-2 to the Legal Section, 
9 June 1947, R.G.331, Box 1434, 20, Case 330, U.S. National Archives; Tsuneishi Keiichi, translated by John 
-XQNHUPDQ´8QLWDQGWKH-DSDQHVH,PSHULDO $UP\·V%LRORJLFDO:DUIDUH3URJUDPµ 
<http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2194>,accessed 24 October 2006.      
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BW knowledge were Unit 731 members who had been swept up in the Soviet drive through 
&KLQD·V1RUWKHast and remained in Soviet custody in the Soviet Far Eastern center of 
Khabarovsk.   It was in Khabarovsk, the military and administrative center of the Russian 
Far East, where the Soviets were slowly preparing a prosecution.  Jiang Jieshi and the 
national [Nationalist?] government showed little apparent interest in obtaining BW 
capabilities, but provincial health departments in the Guomindang heartland of Zhejiang 
were actively researching the ongoing effects of Japanese BW on local populations.8  Jiang·V
deep reliance on American aid and the inchoate nature of the Chinese civil war led his 
government to keep TXLHWDERXW,VKLL6KLUR·s activity; Jiang eschewed any call for the 
-DSDQHVHVFLHQWLVW·VSURVHFXWLRQ.9  And, as shall be seen, it was precisely this type of great-
power dependency which would lead the CCP to the opposite result, calling for the 
immediate prosecution of Ishii Shiro and Emperor Hirohito for BW crimes.  While the CCP 
had already proven its anti-Japanese bona fides to the Chinese people, this particular campaign 
of criticism leveled at the highest levels of the Japanese state was not initiated by the CCP.  
Instead, at a time of great sensitivity in the early months of the PRC, while Mao Zedong and 
                                                 
 
8 Williams and Wallace, Unit 731, p.95-101; Harris, Factories of Death, p. 110.  One of the Chinese doctors 
involved in the original investigation of plague outbreaks in Changde in 1941 presented his report to an 
International Scientific Commission in 1952 during investigations on American BW use; the report was 
subsequently incorporated into Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts 
Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China. (Peking, 1952), Appendix K.  This larger report mentions Jiang 
-LHVKL·VFRPSOLFLW\LQ-DSDQHVH%:EXWEHFDXVHRILWVXVHDVSURSDJDQGDGXULQJWKHFDPSDLJQFDOOVWKH
authenticity of the accusations into doubt.      
 
9 Fang Quanpu, ´-DSDQ-Taiwan Relations, 1949-µPh.D. dissertation, Beijing University, 2006.  
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Zhou Enlai were in Moscow carrying out negotiations, the CCP would be forced by Soviet 
action to trumpet the BW issue domestically, increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in the 
interests of Soviet friendship.10  For all of the postwar powers in East Asia, Cold War 
imperatives seemingly overtook the need for objective pursuit of historical truth, fracturing 
any notion of consensus on the prosecution of BW criminals.   
  New documents from the Foreign Ministry Archive of the PRC now allow for a 
more complete reassessment of the postwar Chinese communist attitude toward Japanese 
bacteriological warfare crimes.  These archives, along with simple examination of 
newspapers from the period, and a reading of the newly published manuscripts of the major 
Chinese participants, indicates the error of scholars who assert the ´VLOHQFHRI[the] 
PDLQODQG«JRYHUQPHQWRYHU-DSDQHVH%:FULPHV.µ 11  In this regard, many researchers have 
taken for granted Sheldon Harris· similar assertion of Chinese silence in his Factories of Death, 
a book whose classic status was not buttressed by work in Chinese archives (and could not 
                                                 
10 Dieter Heinzig, The Soveit Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (Armonk, 
NY.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004); Shen Zhihua, Sidalin, Mao Zedong yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng (Guangzhou: Guandong 
renmin chubanshe, 2003); Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu Mosike de En En Yuan Yuan (Nanning: Jiangxi renmin 
chubanshe, 1999); Yang Kuisong, ´7KH6LQR-Soviet Alliance and Nationalism: A Contradiction,µSocial Sciences 
in China Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 86-99. 
 
11 Jing-%DR1LH´7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RYHU-up of Japanese Wartime Medical Atrocities: Complicity Committed 
LQWKH1DWLRQDO,QWHUHVWDQG7ZR3URSRVDOVIRU&RQWHPSRUDU\$FWLRQµThe American Journal of Bioethics Vol. 6 
No. 3 (2006): W21-W33.  1LH·VRZQELEOLRJUDSK\LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKH&&3WRRNLQWHUHVWLQ%:FULPHVDOVRLQ
1961, when the Party authorized Chunzhong Chubanshe to publish a translation from the Japanese of 
$NL\DPD·VTokushu Butai 731 (Special Unit 731), (Kyoto: Sanichi Shobo, 1956).   
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have been, as the archives only opened in 2004, postdating the untimely death of Mr. 
Harris).12  In fact, the 3HRSOH·V5HSXEOLFZDV anything but silent about BW crimes.  The vocal 
public campaign in China to publicize the Khabarovsk trials and the need to prosecute 
Hirohito for war crimes was accompanied by extensive internal mobilization of Central and 
Provincial ministries to collect evidence of BW crimes and prevent further attacks and 
outbreaks.  That various branches of the new Chinese government, including many former 
Guomindang officials, earnestly sought evidence of Japanese war crimes showed that, 
ultimately, the BW issue would lose its linkage to pro-Soviet mobilization.  The documents 
now bring us to [a crucial moment in the] evolution of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, a 
moment that unfolds within one of the most richly studied and vital events of the early PRC: 
the negotiations for the Sino-Soviet Alliance. 
 
The Khabarovsk Trials and the Sino-Soviet Alliance 
 In late 1949, the issue of Japanese war crimes remained from far the minds of the 
CCP central leadership.  Mao was in Moscow negotiating with Stalin, seemingly preoccupied 
with resolving issues of Soviet naval bases in Dalian and Soviet control of the Changchun 
railway, along with giant loans and security guarantees.  Many of the issues, particularly those 
involving rights in Northeast China, KDGXQZDQWHGUHVRQDQFHZLWK-DSDQ·VSUHYLRXVO\
successful empire building in China, and the security guarantees would eventually mention 
aggression from Japan specifically.  However, while Japan was referred to at many points in 
the negotiations, the issue of war criminals never arose as the focus of conversations with 
                                                 
12 Harris, Factories of Death, pp. 316-317.   
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Soviet leaders.13  Of the three principal Chinese leaders involved in Soviet affairs, neither 
Mao Zedong, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, nor Liu Shaoqi (ruling in Beijing in the absence 
of Mao and Zhou) expressed any interest in pursuing the question of Japanese war crimes at 
such a [that] moment.  And seen from the context of trials themselves, why would the CCP 
had been interested at that moment?  The Tokyo Trials had been concluded for nearly one 
year, and Mao had already covered his anti-Japanese bases by laying down withering 
opprobrium in January 1949 against the Guomindang mistrial of Japanese General Yasuiji 
Okamura.14  While the postwar Chinese public was axiomatically vigilant toward -DSDQ·V
industrial and military revival, the idea of embarking on war crimes trials at such a moment 
for the PRC was almost worthy of ridicule.  The CCP was in the process of solidifying 
power at home, and the legacy of Japanese war crimes that they inherited was scattered to 
say the least.  Much of the documentation on Japanese war crimes remained in the custody 
of the Soviet Union, and even questions as straightforward as which Japanese POWs should 
receive indictments were left unresolved.   
 It was therefore somewhat surprising when, in the waning days of December 1949, 
quite unilaterally during the midst of negoWLDWLRQZLWKWKH&KLQHVH3HRSOH·V5HSXEOLF the 
Soviets undertook a six day trial of Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union.  On December 24, 
1949, a Soviet military court in the Far Eastern border city of Khabarovsk indicted twelve 
                                                 
13 6HUJH\5DGFKHQNRDQG'DYLG:ROII´7RWKH6XPPLWYLD3UR[\-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and 
&KLQHVH$UFKLYHVRQ0DR·V/RQJ0DUFKWR0RVFRZµCold War International History Project Bulletin Vol. 16, pp. 
105-183.  
 
14 0DR=HGRQJ´2Q$UUHVWLQJ2NDPXUDDQG*XRPLQGDQJ&LYLO:DU&ULPLQDOVµ-DQXDU\Selected Works 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), Vol. IV, p. 327.   
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members of Japanese BW units who had been stationed in China during the Second World 
War.  All of the defendants pled guilty to assisting in, or maintaining knowledge of, the 
Japanese BW program.  Clocking in at four days, the trials were relatively brief in duration³ 
certainly if measured against the glacially slow three year Tokyo trials³and although the 
sentences were relatively lenient by Soviet standards, the verdicts were nevertheless 
trumpeted as a well-justified work of justice upon Japanese militarism.15  Prosecutors 
emphasized that the Japanese had tested BW on prisoners, mostly Chinese, while preparing 
for full-scale bacteriological warfare against the people of China and the Soviet Union.16  
While neither Ishii Shiro nor Emperor Hirohito were indicted in absentia, prosecutors at 
Khabarovsk made insistent connections between these individuals, claiming that they held 
responsibility for the BW crimes perpetrated against the Chinese since the early 1930s.  
These assertions allowed the Soviets to exploit a perceived weakness in U.S. East Asian 
policy by conjointly attacking the self-serving policy of the U.S. occupation of protecting 
Hirohito and ignoring the Japanese BW crimes.  The tactic also was meant to demonstrate 
Sino-Soviet friendship by pointing an accusing finger at those who participated in or 
maintained complacency toward Japanese atrocities in China.17 
                                                 
 
15 Trial Documents on Accusations Against Former Japanese Servicemen for Preparation and Use of Bacteriological Weapons, 
Foreign Language Press, Moscow, 1950.  
 
16 ´-DSDQ6DLGWR7HVW%DFWHULRORJLFDO:DUIDUHRQ*,·VµNew York Times, December 27, 1949. 
 
17 For discussion of how the Khabarovsk trials also defended the Soviets against increasingly embarrassing U.S. 
and Japanese accusations of lugubrious repatriation of Japanese from the Soviet Far East, see William Joseph 
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On December 29, 1949, CCP media outlets broke the news on the mainland of the 
Soviet military tribunal in Khabarovsk, and the news dominated Chinese newspapers for two 
or three days thereafter.  The front page of the Lüshun & Dalian Daily (LüDa Renmin Ribao) 
on December 30, 1949 ran long articles about the Khabarovsk trials.  The main editorial, 
below the fold, was absolutely immense ² providing much valuable material for cadre to 
study.18  All of the papers provided reprints of 3HRSOH·V'DLO\ (Renmin Ribao), as few editors at 
local papers would have the time or gumption to compose something so detailed and 
complex about such a delicate international issue, at least not without the commentary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The lack of any editorials or relating articles of local origin from 
a single regional paper in Northeast China shows the rapidity with which the order came 
down to publish the news.  It also indicates, quite correctly, a lack of prior coordination 
between Soviet and Chinese foreign ministry on publicizing the issue.  The Foreign Ministry 
Archive is completely absent of any files indicating knowledge of the Khabarovsk action 
prior to its public announcement, much less behind-the-scenes Sino-Soviet discussion about 
how to coordinate the campaign that followed at the Soviet impetus. 
 The Khabarovsk trials took place in the context of a mounting propaganda war for 
Chinese public opinion.  Scrupulous CCP editors were increasingly leavening newspapers 
and journals with ever-more numinous articles translated from the Soviet press0RVFRZ·V
TASS coverage of the Khabarovsk trials flowed readily into Chinese media outlets both 
because the Soviets demanded it and CCP wanted to appear accommodating to the Soviets 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sebald with Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (London: The Cresset 
Press, 1965).      
 
18 LüDa Ribao, Dec. 30, 1949. 
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at a sensitive moment.19  Thus, when the Soviets undertook to publicize the positive aspects 
of the Khabarovsk trials, it was expected that the Chinese media would partake in and 
support the campaign.20   
 The CCP dutifully followed in their press coverage the themes laid out by the Soviet 
precedent.  Emphasizing +LURKLWR·VFXOSDELOLW\Xinhua dispatches broadened the definition 
of Japanese war crimes to expand beyond Northeast China to discussion of the harm Japan 
had caused to the Soviet people.  Here the Khabarovsk trials served a dual purpose: the 
Soviets were exacting justice upon the Japanese, and the trial could put to rest the notion 
that the Soviets had permitted Japan to run wild in China in the 1930s without tendering any 
sacrifices of their own.  Sacrifices had been made by Soviet comrades against Japan, the 
                                                 
 
19 7R0DOHQNRY/LX6KDRTLQRWHGWKH&&3·VGHVLUHWRVHWXS´5XVVLDQODQJXDJHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURSDJDQGD
EURDGFDVWLQJµLQ6KDQJKDLDQG%HLMLQJDQGEHVHHFKHG6RYLHWKHOSZLWKWKLVYHQWXUH/LXDOVRH[SUHVsed a desire 
IRUKHOSVHWWLQJXS´(QJOLVKODQJXDJHFRPUDGHVµyingwen de tongzhi) for establishing overseas propaganda 
FDSDELOLW\$VIRU6RYLHWILOPVSHFLDOLVWVWKHVHZRXOGFRPHWR&KLQDDW6WDOLQ·VVXJJHVWLRQ6HHLiu Shaoqi, 
´/HWWHUWR0DOHQNRY&RQFHUQLQJWKH3UREOHPRI,QYLWLQJ1HZV6SHFLDOLVWVIURPWKH6RYLHW8QLRQµ$XJXVW
1949, Liu Shaoqi Wengao, vol. 1, pp. 42-43; /LX6KDRTL´7HOHJUDSKWR&&3&HQWUDO&RPPLWWHH&RQFHUQLQJWKH
3UREOHPRI6RYLHW)LOP&UHZV&RPLQJWR:RUNLQ&KLQDµ$XJXVW49,  Liu Shaoqi Wengao , vol. 1, p. 49; 
Central Committee to East China BureauUHYLVHGE\/LX6KDRTL´7HOHJUDSK5HJDUGLQJ:RUNRI)LOP&UHZVLQ
(DVW&KLQD$UHDVµ1RYLiu Shaoqi Wengao, vol. 1, p. 134.     
 
20 Jing-Bao Nie, ´7KH:HVW·s Dismissal of the Khabarovsk TULDODV¶&RPPXQLVW3URSDJDQGD·,GHRORgy, 
Evidence and International BLRHWKLFVµ-RXUQDORI%LRHWKLFDO,QTXLU\9RO1R$SULO-42. 
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stories implicitly argued.  More pragmatically, such rhetoric lent to the theme of a natural 
alliance against Japan and the United States based on the mutual suffering at the hands of 
the Japanese and equal threat in the face of an impending US-Japanese military alliance. 
 A front-page article in the Shenyang Ribao on December 29 hearkened back to the 
establishment of Unit 731, the most infamous of the Japanese BW units, mirroring the 
testimony at the Khabarovsk trial.  Unit 731 had operated under the direction not only of Lt. 
Ishii ShiroWKHDUWLFOHDVVHUWHGEXWRI(PSHURU+LURKLWR7KHDUWLFOHVXEWLWOHG´'HIHQGDQW
Admits Using BWµZHQWRQWR outline in detail -DSDQ·VBW facilities in Manchuria.  One 
passage GHVFULEHGDQXQGHUJURXQGMDLOSRSXODWHGE\´&KLQHVHSDWULRWVand Soviet people into 
ZKRPWKH-DSDQHVHLQMHFWHGFKHPLFDOZHDSRQVµSRUWUD\LQJWKH8665DVDQHTXDOYLFWLPRI
-DSDQ·VGHSUDYLWy.21  Subsequent articles emphasized mutual Sino-Soviet suffering from 
-DSDQ·V%:SURJUDPFLWLQJWKH1939 Soviet-Japanese border battle of Nomonhan.22  The 
Shenyang Ribao later used the trials as a VSULQJERDUGIRUGLVFXVVLRQRI-DSDQ·Vbacteriological 
war crimes beyond the northeast, extending analysis to Japanese-initiated plague outbreaks 
in Guangzhou and Nanjing in the early 1940s.  The articles served not only a historical 
purpose, but criticized the omission of these facts from the Tokyo Trials, all the while 
                                                 
21 ´6RYLHW8QLRQ0LOLWDU\7ULDORI-DSDQHVH:DU&ULPLQDOVµShenyang Ribao, December 29, 1949, p. 1 [emphasis 
added]. 
 
22 ´6RYLHW&RDVWDO0LOLWDU\5HJLRQ0LOLWDU\&RXUW&RQWLQXHV3URVHFXWLRQRI-DSDQHVH%LRORJLFDO:DU&ULPLQDOV
Shantian Qisan [ኡ⭠Ҏй] Admits the Production of Biological Weapons for the Purpose of Waging War 
Against the USSR, 0RQJROLDDQG&KLQDµShenyang Ribao, Dec. 30, 1949, p. 1. 
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praising the Khabarovsk prosecution as a vigorous counterfoil to American judicial 
inaction.23 
The Foreign Ministry accelerated its exchange of documents with Xinhua in Beijing, 
funneling newsworthy items and bacteriological weapons charges to the news agency for 
publication.  The Foreign Ministry and the Health Ministry each siphoned documents to 
Xinhua, and it appears that after the Soviet declaration of December 29, the news agency 
took real interest in promoting the atrocities of Japanese BW research in mainland China.  
Thus, at the very outset of the 1950s, oQ1HZ<HDU·V'D\&KLQHVHQHZVSDSHUUHDGHUVwere 
greeted by no fewer than three articles on Japanese bacteriological warfare.  The first was a 
translated Pravda piece on the trials clearly intended to stir anti-Japanese nationalism; two 
accompanying articles discussed the views of Soviet as well as French experts who asserted 
that while some Japanese were receiving justice in Khabarovsk, America was recalcitrant to 
bring charges against Japanese war criminals under its control.24   
 In Lüshun, on January 7 scientists convened for a meeting on the theme of BW, and 
the Soviet position: against both imperialism and bacteriological weapons atrocities.  In 
urging China to sign an alliance with the Soviet Union, the scientists were hardly unique.  
+RZHYHUWKLVUHSRUWV·HPSKDVLVRQVSUHDGLQJWKHSURSDJDQGDFDPSDLJQZHOOEH\RQGSUR-
Soviet aims is worth noting7KHIROORZLQJH[FHUSWVIURPWKHVFLHQWLVWV·UHSRUWRQWKH
                                                 
 
23 ´6RYLHW&RXUW&RQWLQXHV3URVHFXWLRQRI-DSDQHVH%LRORJLFDO:DU&ULPLQDOVµShenyang Ribao, Dec. 31, 1949, 
p. 1. 
 
24 ´3URVHFXWLQJWKH-DSDQHVH&KHPLFDO:DU&ULPLQDOV(TXDOV3URVHFXWLQJ$OOWKH&KHmical Warfare Criminals: 
0DL\HYVN\·V$UWLFOH7KHVLV3XEOLVKHGLQPravda,µRenmin Ribao, Jan. 1, 1950. 
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meeting are of interest both for their insistence on the justification for a Sino-Soviet alliance, 
and for their unusual interpretation of the Japanese BW crimes.  A broad editorial by Li 
Shiliang (ᵾ༛ӞHQWLWOHG´,PSHULDOLVPLVIWVHOIDQ$WURFLW\µᑍഭѫѹቡᱟ㖚ᚦ) noted 
´we can see how American imperialists try to take over everything, economically and 
otherwise in China, Vietnam, and other places, massacring millions.  The Americans made 
the atomic bomb and they made bacteriological weapons and chemical weapons to massacre 
even more people.µ  Turning American technological superiority to the advantage of the 
CCP, the scientists interpreted BW research as of a piece with the atomic bomb, perhaps 
playing to the knowledge and consequent opposition to the United States by the tens of 
thousands of Japanese still living in Dalian.  The editorial also showed how the impetus to 
publicize the Khabarovsk trials, the Soviets and the CCP further stoked the discourse on 
Chinese victimhood: 
The Chinese people are the worsWYLFWLPVRI IDVFLVP·VFULPHVand we 
must, therefore, increase our spirit of vigilance«. First we must increase 
GHIHQVH DJDLQVW EDQGLW DJHQWV· ZRUN EHFDXVH EDFWHULRORJLFDO ZHDSRQV DUH
not possible to see with RQH·Veyes.  Bacteriological weapons represent an 
incomprehensible type of warfare; these are weapons that can be used at 
any time (ᒣᰦ).  We must spare nothing in the defense against BW.   
 
To do this we must use every available method.  Through a series of 
movements, we must make books, newspapers, radio broadcasts, movies, 
folk performances, songs, opera, etc., telling the masses about science work 
and how to protect themselves against common diseases and the deadly 
crimes of the bandits.  We must use science thusly to serve the whole 
SHRSOH·V SURGXFWLRQ pooling our talents together as one to increase 
national defense.   
 
Finally and yet most importantly, we need more and ever-increasingly 
to let the Soviet Union lead the peaceful democratic people of the world in 
unity and cooperation.  Soviet power will protect us from those who love 
war and prevent agents [of imperialism] from freely carrying out their 
incendiary and illegal atrocities.  Proof of this idea can be seen in the first-
ever decision of a court to try the Japanese scientists [in Khabarovsk] who 
are the bacteriological warfare war criminals for their especially big crimes 
dating from years back.  
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In spite of all of this, scientists may yet exist who will continue to aid 
imperialism by gathering research to create whose purpose is to inflict 
death on a massive scale. WHGRQ·WXQGHUVWDQG the ways of these horrific 
killers and running dogs who remain free to carry out such behavior, nor 
do we understand their spirit of running amok to commit atrocities.  
Therefore we must use the spirit of the [Khabarovsk] trials to conduct 
propaganda, using the best methods as scientists to educate, drill, and bring 
our knowledge to the people.  This is the kind of work we can carry out. 25     
 
A number of important themes shine through in this editorial.  The article clearly shows the 
convergence of the BW trial with the hunt for domestic agents of the Guomindang, and the 
rhetoric also clearly prefigures that of the later patriotic hygiene campaigns of 1952.26  Most 
LPSRUWDQWO\WKHHGLWRULDO·VHPSKDVLVRQWKHOHVVRQVRIWKHBW revelations should be noted.  
According to the authors, Soviet leadership alone could protect China from militarists 
abroad and keep China safe from further crimes of Japanese science.  What went unspoken 
here was the inability of the PRC as it was presently configured to assure the guarantee of 
security against a Japanese revival, in what was effectively a litmus test for any modern 
Chinese regime.  
 Just as the Lüshun scientists urged each other to overflow the common methods of 
editorial writing into the arts of agitation, so too did the CCP seek to bring the BW issue 
forward to the whole population via the publication of cartoons.  In framing public 
discourse on BW crimes, Chinese cartoons played a role that was perhaps as important as 
the published discussions of experts and articles.  Cartoons conveyed an essentially similar, 
but more biting, message directed at both literate elites and semi-literate citizens.  Like the 
                                                 
25 Li Shiliang (ᵾ༛Ӟ), ´,PSHULDOLVPLVIWVHOIDQ$WURFLW\µᑍഭѫѹቡᱟ㖚ᚦ), LuDa Ribao, Jan. 8, 1950 
 
26 5XWK5RJDVNL´1DWXUH$QQLKLODWLRQDQG0RGHUQLW\&KLQD·V.RUHDQ:DU*HUP-Warfare Experience 
5HFRQVLGHUHGµSS-390. 
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printed articles, cartoons on the Japanese threat conveyed the importance of the 
Khabarovsk trials, but articulated CCP policy terms that were more basic and unmistakable: 
the Soviet Union was tough on Japanese bacteriological warfare, while the United States was 
resurrecting Japanese militarism.  Cartoonists frequently paired negative images of the 
Japanese with depictions of stern Soviet judges, familiarizing viewers with the benefits of 
Soviet alliance.  Similarly, Japanese were also juxtaposed with their big-nosed American 
masters.  On January 8, 1950, the Renmin Ribao published one such cartoon by the popular 
artist Hua Junwu concerning both of the major powers of the Cold War and their differing 
attitudes toward Japanese BW crimes.  [Figure 1.] 
 
)LJXUH+XD-XQZX´$Q2EYLRXV&RQWUDVWµRenmin Ribao, January 8, 1950. 
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In the top panel, Hua Junwu depicts the Khabarovsk trials, where a judge, ´the Soviet 
Union,µ holds a paper decreeing ´Verdicts Ready for Japanese Bacteriological Weapons War 
Criminals, Khabarovsk Region: Go to Labor Camp for 25 Years and 18 Years of 
,PSULVRQPHQWµ)ULHQGVKLSZLWKWKH8665 was thus depicted as a means of satisfying the 
Chinese need to see Japan humbled.  Hua had had years of practice caricaturing Japanese 
soldiers, and had scored many successes in his depictions of American imperialist troops, 
resulting in his work being reprinted in Pyongyang.  However, his drawing of Soviet friends 
in Figure 1 indicates that he lacked experience in depicting Russians and was seeking for a 
method appropriate to the new relationship.  While the Soviet judge in Figure 1 is ill-defined, 
the Japanese are depicted clearly enough, all humbled by their manifest errors.  Contrasting 
with the moral clarity of Khabarovsk, the bottom panel depicts DQ´$PHULFDQ2FFXSDWLRQ
Office,µwhere a large ´$PHULFDQ,PSHULDOLVWµWRORRNGRZQSURXGO\DWWKH´+LGden 
Japanese Bacteriological War Criminal TakeQRULµ27  6PRNHLVVXHVIURPWKH$PHULFDQ·VSLSH
(positioned at his wrist), either a reference to Douglas MacArthur or an inference of the past 
FORXGVRIFKHPLFDODJHQWVUHOHDVHGLQ&KLQDE\WKH-DSDQHVH7KH´$PHULFDQ,PSHULDOLVWµ
naturally, is gratified at the obedience of his diminutive Japanese assistant.  In both top and 
bottom panels, we note that the Japanese remain clad in Kwantung army uniforms, 
LQGLFDWLQJWKHLULQKHUHQWWLHVWRPLOLWDULVPDQG0DF$UWKXU·Vacceptance of  Japanese 
militarism representing a potential future threat to China.  Although depictions of Japanese 
war criminals, even the general Okamura Yasuji, rarely featured names, this cartoon did.  
Perhaps Hua Junwu intended for literate readers to be attuned to a pun contained in the 
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capWLRQ7DNDQRUL·Vfirst name, when rendered into Chinese (Si Langഋ䛾), is homophonous 
with se lang 㢢⤬RU´VH[ZROIµ  
 As news of the Khabarovsk trials faded into background with the coming of the 
New Year, the Chinese news media moved forward with several stories that unhooked 
Soviet trials from Japanese atrocities and focused more purely on the latter topic.  The 
coordination between the Foreign Ministry and the Xinhua grew larger in early January 1950, 
when Japanese atrocities took on greater scrutiny in the press.  Some of the articles stemmed 
from reader responses to the articles about Khabarovsk, showing the unintended 
consequences of the Soviets pushing the topic of Japanese BW to the front of the Chinese 
public debate.  One reader·V letter to Xinhua came as a response to Xinhua Ribao·V articles 
of December 31, 1949.28  On January 12, the reader offered his critiques to local officials:  
 
7RWKHUHVSRQVLEOHFRPUDGHLQWKH%HLMLQJ&LW\3HRSOH·V*RYHUQPHQW 
 I saw the fourth version of the article printed in the Xinhua Ribao on 
WKH ODVW GD\ RI · UHJDUGLQJ ´-DSDQHVH War Criminals Preparations For and 
Guilty Use of Bacteriological :HDSRQVµ 7KLV DUWLFOH LQFOXGHG WKH SKUDVH
´XVLQJbacteriological ZHDSRQVGXULQJ WKHZDUDJDLQVW&KLQDµDVKRUWZD\RI
saying that many Japanese war criminals in China released bacteriological 
agents.  I know this, however I still accept that past casualties attributed to 
such weapons areࠐѾїભⲴ.  
 
7KHUHLVD´EORRGLQKDOLQJLQVHFWµ>HJPRVTXLWR@EDFWHULD>HJPDODULD@7KLV
bacteria is in water.  When I was in Zhenjiang Beigushan (at Tianlu Temple), 
many people adjacent to the Yangtze River got this sickness. According to the 
ORFDOSHRSOH·VGLVFXVVLRQ WKLVGLVHDVHZDVUHOHDVHGDW WKH WLPHZKHQ-DSDQHVH
                                                 
28 Liu Dong (ࡈь) to the Responsible CRPUDGHDW;LQKXD´$ERXW;LQKXD5LEDR·V+DQGOLQJRIWKH
Handwritten Letter to Our Foreign Affairs Ministry Regarding Japanese War Criminals Spreading Biological 
Weapons in Our Country, Hope to Publish,µMFA Archive, 105-00076-02, pp. 3-5.   
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people were in China, and it has been preserved until now.  Then after I 
recovered frRPWKHVLFNQHVVLQ6X]KRX3DQPHQOL·V+HELQWKHUHZDVVRPHWKLQJ
written: ´This water contains ´PDODULDEXJVµUHOHDVHGE\WKH-DSDQHVHGRQRW
use WKLV ZDWHUµ  Ah!  There are still many such testimonies of Japanese 
releasing bacteriological weapons in China!  Please responsible comrades, could 
you not inform the government of this? 29 
 
While the letter appears relatively elementary, and certainly did not spur investigations, it was 
useful for propaganda purposes.   
 That the CCP considered reprinting this letter indicates that the government thought 
that basic education to the Chinese public about the BW crimes of Japan was further 
necessary [still needed]. The notion of mass involvement, and the value of individual 
testimonies, were further highlighted.  However, at its core, it shows how BW-related items, 
indeed anything that validated the strategy, was published immediately and with some 
urgency at that time.30  The apparent lack of large numbers of similar documents predating 
the Khabarovsk trials contrasted greatly with the glut of documents that followed the trials, 
ranging from BW investigations, speculations, and denunciations.  These indicate that, apart 
from of the areas of the Northeast, public agitation on these issues was mostly new at the 
time.  The short citizen letter above GULIWHGWRWKHWRSRI&KLQD·VIRUHLJQDIIDLUVEXUHDXFUDF\
UHFHLYLQJDWWHQWLRQIURP=KRX(QODL·VRIILFHDQGVXEVHTXHQWO\=KDQJ+DQIXDQG+X
Qiaomu.  Zhang Hanfu indicated that the letter should be shared with news agencies in 
                                                 
29 Liu Dong (ࡈьWRWKH5HVSRQVLEOH&RPUDGHDW;LQKXD´$ERXW;LQKXD5LEDR·V+DQGOLQJRIWKH
Handwritten Letter to Our Foreign Affairs Ministry Regarding Japanese War Criminals Spreading Biological 
Weapons in Our Country, Hope to Publish,µMFA Archive, 105-00076-02, pp. 3-5.   
 
30 Not incidentally, this type of citizen testimony, often inaccurate, is precisely what helped to push forward the 
1952 campaign and led to serious inaccuracies of assessment of U.S. BW use.  See Patricia Nash, Wittenberg p. 
105; see also Rogaski, pp. 381-415.   
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Nanjing in particular, while the Asia Office of the MFA directed Xinhua to publish the piece 
immediately. 31    
 On January 19, seeking material to keep the campaign going, the Waijiaobu asked 
;LQKXDH[SUHVVO\WRSXEOLVKWKHFLWL]HQ·VOHWWHUDERXWWKHLQVHFts.32  The same day, the 
Foreign Ministry noted its receipt of BW-related documents from Nanjing Ribao which they 
held in reserve for publication.33  +X4LDRPX·VFRPPHQWDU\RQWKHOHWWHULVSDUWLFXODUO\
telling.  In one of the very few pieces of evidence revHDOLQJ+X·VKDQGin the vast MFA 
correspondence, Hu states WKDWWKHQRWHVKRXOG´EHNHSWE\RXUGHSDUWPHQWIRUIXrther use 
LQWKHIXWXUHµ34  Hu QiaomX·Vinvolvement in the process shows that the BW issue, 
specifically the manner in which it should be publicized and the degree to which to involve 
the masses, was granted the highest levels of internal attention in Zhongnanhai.  The 
                                                 
 
31 Ibid, pp. 6-7.  1RWHVRI=KRX(QODL·V2IILFH=KDQJ+DQIX$VLDQ'HSDUWPHQWof Foreign Ministry, and Hu 
Qiaomu. 
 
32 ´1RWHIURP0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVWRWKH5HVSRQVLEOH&RPUDGHDW;LQKXDULEDRVKHKXLIXZXVKLµ0)$
Archive, 105-00076-02, p. 8. 
 
33 ´1RWHIURP)LUVW6HFUHWDU\WR6HFUHWDU\RI0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVµ-DQ0)$$UFKLYH-
00076-02, p. 6-7. 
 
34 +X·VXELTXLW\LQWKHHDUO\\HDUVRIWKH35&LVEHOLHGE\KLVDEVHQFHLQWKHDUFKLYHVZKHUHDVHDUFKIRUKLV
name iQWLWOHVRIGRFXPHQWVWXUQVXSH[DFWO\]HURGRFXPHQWV3HUKDSVWKHJXDUGLDQVRIWKLVFDQRQLFDOOHDGHU·V
documents are hoarding his personal archives in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, where the former 
propagandist ended his active career as President.   For published materials on Hu, see Hu Qiaomu Hu Qiaomu 
Wenji, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1992); Hu Qiaomu Shuxinji. (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2002).   
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Foreign Ministry in Beijing closely tabulated and traced the publication of articles and media 
pieces about the BW campaign.   
 
The Northeast Connection 
 Some ministries in the CCP bureaucracy were more ready than others to spring upon 
this news and expand upon it.  In Northeast China (Dongbei), the regional government had 
DOUHDG\EHHQFROOHFWLQJHYLGHQFHRI-DSDQ·VFULPHVDQGZDVbetter equipped to begin 
publicizing the Khabarovsk trials.  As the area of China longest consolidated under CCP rule 
(as Yenan had been evacuated in 1947), the Northeast naturally led the way forward on the 
BW question.35   
 One of the foremost publishers RIPDWHULDOZDVWKH1RUWKHDVW3HRSOH·VGovernment 
Department of Public Heath.  This department had been involved in plague prevention quite 
heavily since 1946, when a major outbreak had occurred near Pingfan.  In 1950, they  
published a number of exposes on Takenori, as well as more entertaining short stories on 
the themes of BW, stories aimed at a younger demographic.36  Specific accounts of Unit 731 
and the activities of Ishii Shiro, who for once was referred to more than Hirohito or 
                                                 
 
35 On CCP consolidation in the Northeast, see Robert Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Victory in 
Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
 
36 On anti-Soviet sentiment among Chinese youth, see Strategic Services Unit, Mukden [Shenyang], April 11, 
1946, document no. A-´6WXGHQW'HPRQVWUDWLRQVLQ0XNGHQµNational Archives Microfilm Publication 
M1656, roll 1; Strategic Services Unit Intelligence Reports, 1945-1946; Records of the Office of Strategic 
Services, Record Group 226; Archives II Research Room Services Branch, National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland. 
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Okamura Yasuji, filled papers in Northeast China and were printed as pamphlets.37  In 
Harbin, the Weishengbu published an 80-page pamphlet whose humorous title page -- a 
cartoon image of a portly MacArthur spiriting away a toxic baby representing Unit 731 war 
criminals and Hirohito -- belied the utter seriousness of the contents.  This large collection 
of research materials on the BW problem was issued rapidly, indicating the comprehensive 
UHVHDUFKGRQHRQ8QLWLQ+DUELQDQGWKDWFLW\·VOHDGLQJSRVLWLRQLQpromoting justice for 
the crimes.  Within this pamphlet were a large amount of evidence about the five individuals 
who were currently in Japan who they wished to try, along with extensive sections dedicated 
to the Khabarovsk trials evidence.38    
 On February 5, 1950 Renmin Ribao ran DKXJHKHDGOLQHVWDWLQJ´6RYLHW*RYHUQPHQW
Presents a Note to Our Government Suggesting the Establishment of a Special International 
Military Court to Prosecute Bacteriological War Criminal Hirohitoµ39  The newspaper went 
on to give evidence of the chemical weapons facilities and testimonials that the Japanese had 
use aircraft to spread pests over China·VVRXWKHUQDUHDV.  Such headlines, focusing on areas 
UHPRWHIURP&KLQD·VQRUWKHDVWQRWonly indicated that the Japanese bacteriological weapons 
program had spread far beyond Manchuria, but represented the CCP drive to mobilize the 
entire nation around the problems of the Northeast.   The use of the BW issue more than six 
                                                 
 
37 Foreign Ministry Archives, File # 105-00076-02, ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ, p. 80. 
 
38  ´(YLGHQFH Materials RI8QLW%DFWHULRORJLFDO:HDSRQV$WURFLWLHVµ0)$$UFKLYHV-00076-03, 
2.1.1950, pp. 10-24, 26, 35, 40-55.     
 
39 Renmin Ribao, Feb. 5, 1950.    
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weeks after the Khabarovsk trials had concluded showed Soviet awareness of the potency of 
the BW issue as a lever over Chinese public opinion.  Again the initiation was Soviet, not 
Chinese.   
 A survey of Xinhua publications reveal the narrative taken by the CCP in regards to 
Japanese BW crimes and remain an important means of gauging the desired public reaction 
to the Soviet trials.  However, analysis of recently released inner-Party documents are now 
beginning to allow for confirmation of motives behind the publication and a deeper 
understanding of the backroom politics involved with the issue.  What is revealed is that as 
the pace of negotiations and drafts accelerated in Moscow, so too did inner-Party debate, 
negotiation, and correspondence about the BW issue.  The role of Japan was therefore 
increased in public communications anticipating the alliance.  On February 6, Liu Shaoqi, 
spent a little more than half an hour at the Soviet embassy in Beijing dealing in most explicit 
fashion with the Soviets on the war criminal issue.  As relayed by the Soviet Ambassador to 
his government, Liu said: 
 
7KH&HQWUDO3HRSOH·V*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH3HRSOH·V5HSXblic of China 
VXSSRUWVWKH6RYLHWJRYHUQPHQW·VVXJJHVWLRQWKDW(PSHURU+LURKLWREHKDQGHG
over to an international military criminal court.  The [publication of the] note is 
already arousing the whole society to support the proposal.   
 
Liu Shaoqi said that he has already instructed Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong 
to draft a reply on behalf of the Central Government to support the Soviet 
JRYHUQPHQW·VQRWH7KH&HQWUDO*RYHUQPHQWLWVHOILQWHQds to present this 
note to the Soviet Union and British governments.  Owing to the lack of 
recognition of the PRC by the American and French governments, we intend 
to have the note passed to these governments via the British. Liu Shaoqi asked 
for my help wLWKWKHGUDIWLQJRIWKH>35&@)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\·VUHVSRQVHWRWKHQRWHEHFDXVH
the Chinese Foreign Ministry lacks sufficient experience, and they have not studied or drafted 
analogous documents [emphasis added].40    
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It appears difficult to believe that, wLWKWKH3DUW\·VORQJH[SHULHQFHLQGHFU\LQJ-DSDQHVH
militarism along with all the self-assurance flowing out of Beijing at this time, that the 
Chinese Communist Party could credibly assert that they lacked the experience to draft a 
memorandum about Japanese war crimes.  However, it appears that Liu deferred to the 
Soviets most completely in this matter.  His assertion that the masses were already mobilized 
to support the directive is likely correct.    
In connection with Liu Shaoqi·VPHHWLQJZhou Enlai sent a telegram from Moscow 
WR/LX6KDRTLRQ)HEUXDU\UHSUHVHQWLQJ0DR·VYLHZVRQWKHMDLOLQJDQGSURVHFXWLRQ
of Japanese BW criminals.  It reads: 
 
On February 1, Soviet embassies in Washington, London, and Beijing 
transmitted a letter to the three respective governments of the United States, 
Britain, and China on the pretense of (ceng yi zhao kai) imprisoning and having an 
international military tribunal for the five big Japanese bacteriological weapons 
war criminals.  I assume our Foreign Ministry has already received this 
information, so it should immediately publish the complete document on the 
front page of every Chinese newspaper (quan guo shou ye fa biao).   
 
8QGHU9LFH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU/L.HQRQJ·VQDPHLPPHGLDWHO\ZULWHDUHVSRQVH
representiQJWKH35&&HQWUDO*RYHUQPHQW·VFRPSOHWHDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH
suggestion provided by the government of the Soviet Union.  Recall that 
according to the April 3, 1946 resolution of the Far Eastern Committee, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East should have aimed not just to jail 
but prosecute the five big Japanese bacteriological weapons war criminals; it 
must be recommended in future meetings of the International Military Tribunal 
WKDW&KLQDZLOOEHUHSUHVHQWHGRQO\E\WKH&HQWUDO3HRSOH·V*RYHrnment of the 
PRC Central Government.  Absolutely no Jiang Jieshi representation will be 
tolerated, as he and his counterrevolutionary group have already lost their rights.  
                                                                                                                                                 
40 ´Xiebayefu Regarding the Matter of Arrangements for a Chinese Communist Delegation to Visit the Soviet 
Union and a Memorandum of Talks with Liu Shaoqiµ)HEǍǏǜǝǡ>5XVVLDQ3UHVLGHQWLDO$UFKLYH@ˈ
ȁˈǻǼˈǼˈǱˈǸ-61. 
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$WWKHVDPHWLPHLQ>/L.HQRQJ·V@UHVSRQVHOHWWHU\RXVKRXOGSUDLVHWKH
Khabarovsk Military Court from December 25th to 30th, 1949 for presenting 
such credible and just achievements, and reveal the anger present in the Chinese 
people who personally (qin shao) experienced family deaths because of the 
bacteriological weapons of the fascist enemy.  This will increase appreciation for 
RXU6RYLHWIULHQGV&RQYHUVHO\WKHOHWWHUVKRXOGZDUQWKHZRUOGFRXQWULHV·
governments which have the heart to protect and revive (cun xin fu zhi) Japanese 
imperialism in preparations for a new World War.  They should be warned that 
only unjust governments will refuse the righteous call of the Soviet Union and  
continue to protect the number-one guilty poison perpetrator of massacring 
humanity (zui e sha ren), the head of the war criminals, Japanese Emperor 
Hirohito.   
 
After the strategy of this first draft response letter is complete, immediately show 
it to the Center [zhongyang, e.g., the Central Committee].  At the same time, you 
should send copies of those letters to British and American governments, and 
those nations on the Far Eastern Committee.  In order to cooperate with the 
Soviet letter and the Chinese answer, Xinhua should publish an editorial.41 
 
=KRX·VVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKHHGLWRULDOVKRXOG´UHYHDOWKHDQJHUSUHVHQWLQWKH&KLQHVHSHRSOH
who personally (qin shao) experienced family deaths because of the bacteriological weapons 
RIWKHIDVFLVWHQHP\µLVTXLWLQWHUHVWLQJDVLVWKHFRQVHTXHQWWRWKLVDQWHFHGHQW´7KLVZLOO
LQFUHDVHDSSUHFLDWLRQIRURXU6RYLHWIULHQGVµ1RZKHUHLQWKHGRFXPHQWVLVLWVWated more 
nakedly than at this moment: the CCP was using anti-Japanese sentiment to drive the 
Chinese people into the arms of the Soviet Union. 
 0DR·VFRPPHQts on this matter are unknown; certainly nothing has appeared in the 
known archives or his published manuscripts.  However, the terseness of the above memo, 
DQGWKHGLUHFWLYHWRKDYHLWSDVVHGWKURXJKWKH0DR·VKDQGVVKRZVWKDWWKHLVVXHZDV
                                                 
41 Quoted in Liu Shaoqi Wengao, S´7HOHJUDSKWR0DR=HGRQJ5HJDrding the Situation of the Negotiation 
and Signing of the Sino-6RYLHW7UHDW\µ)HEUXDU\DQG See also ´6RYLHWJRYHUQPHQWGHOLYHUVDQRWH
to our government with a proposal to set up an international court to try all classes of Japanese bacteriological 
ZHDSRQVFULPLQDOVµ, Renmin Ribao, Feb. 5, 1950, p. 1.   
  
  
27 
27 
regarded as important and worthy of being reviewed closely and controlled.  The document 
likewise makes evident the specific desire of the CCP leadership to utilize the trial to 
stimulate anti-Japanese feeling in hopes of convincing the Chinese people of the benefits of 
Soviet friendship.  ,WDOVRVKRZV=KRX·VWRXJKQHVVThe Soviet note of Feburary 5 was 
serving its purpose.42   
 Now that direction had been given from the highest levels and the Khabarovsk 
verdict seen as more than a simple top-down propaganda campaign, the ministries became 
more active.  The Central Ministry of Health was an active participant and the prime mover 
for the internal discussions in China, but the Foreign Ministry, once it understood the ability 
they had to move international dialogue during the negotiations, took the impetus in the 
person of Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu, an experienced cadre who made his imprint 
on events.  The main center of research regarding prior Japanese BW crimes in China (and 
later the front lines in the preventative health campaigns of 1952-1953) was the  Weishengbu, 
or  Health Bureau.  Press commentaries stimulated further actions within the government, 
and an ´XUJHQWµmeeting was called as a result.  In this meeting, several departments would 
be represented, including Health, Public Security, Political Affairs (zhengzhibu), and News.  
Clearly the problem was one for which many departments of the Central Government 
                                                 
42 It also appears likely that the negotiations for how to handle the war crimes issue were done in Beijing with 
Liu Shaoqi as the point person.  It appears likely that this was done so as to facilitate rapid activation of 
;LQKXDZKLFKZDVQRWDSDUWRI0DR·VGHOHJDWLRQDQGWRJHWWKHPRVWUDSLGSXEOLFLW\IRUYDULRXVGLUHFWLYHV
from Moscow.  %HFDXVH´DQWL--DSDQHVHSURSDJDQGDµLVDIUHTXHQWDFFXVDWLRQWKURZQDWWKH&&3LWPD\EH
useful to divine which members of the CCP hierarchy were pushing for public attention to the BW issue.  
Understanding this would give readers a more nuanced and variegated look at how the less-than-monolithic 
CCP approaches the issue of anti-Japanese nationalism more generally.    
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required mobilization and activation.43  Direction from Moscow had led to a more 
comprehensive discussion of the problem, and at a rapid pace.  Mao and Zhou in Moscow 
could be assured that the administration they had left behind was functioning smoothly in 
their absence.  In agreeing to meet with Foreign Ministry colleagues, the Health Ministry 
officials stated that SXUSRVHRIWKHLUPHHWLQJZDVWR´GLVFXVVTXHVWLRQRIpast bacteriological 
warfare atrocities (䗷৫ᡰѮ㹼Ⲵ㓶㧼ᡈҹ䰞仈).µ  Zhang Hanfu requested that three of 
his Foreign Ministry comrades attend: they were Yang Gang (ᶘ዇), Qiao Guanhua (҄ߐॾ
) and Wen Jianfeng.44  The topic of the meeting encompassed discussion of the Japanese 
atrocities, but also raised several implications for the future handling of BW issues.45  The 
meeting concluded with a resolution to continue study of the impact of Japanese BW 
research in China, and a determined declaration to inform the people of the Japanese 
crimes.46   
                                                 
43 )RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\´Ѫ䇘䇪ᩌ䳶ᰕ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟µMFA Archive, 105-00076-02, ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼
Ⲵᶀᯉ, p. 21. 
 
44 ´1RWHIURP&HQWUDO+HDOWK0LQLVWU\WR)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\µ)HE0)$$UFKLYH-00076-02, ޣҾᩌ
䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ p. 9.   
 
45 Ibid. 
 
46 For first-hand account of the meeting, see Wen Jianfeng, ´Report on Participating Discussions at Meeting 
Convened by Central Health Ministry Regarding Japanese Biological Weapons War Crimes,µ Feb. 9, 1950.MFA 
Archives, 105-00076-02, p. 15.  A few excerpts from the meeting proceedings were published the next day by 
;LQKXD6HH´Evidence Materials RI8QLW%DFWHULRORJLFDO:HDSRQV$WURFLWLHVµ0)$$UFKLYHV-00076-
03, 2.1.1950, pp. 60-62.    
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  The Department of Health  was vigorously involved in the case; their documents 
show some anger.  ´'RQ·WEHWKHVODYHVRIWKHZDUFULPLQDOVµWKH\DGPRQLVKHG´All the 
scientist workers are united to protect the Soviet suggestion of organizing a special military 
tribunal.µ  Liu Shaoqi went so far as to send the Waijiaobu report to Zhou and Mao in 
Moscow in 1950 for comment.47  The February 9 meeting was significant for many reasons.  
First, decisions had to be made quickly as Mao was in Moscow and the pending pact lent 
some urgency to events.  The meeting presaged very intensive steps to data collection on 
BW issues, but more importantly placed the investigations in the context of the developing 
Sino-Soviet relationship³squaring off against the Jiang regime and the United States.  The 
UHSRUWE\RQHRIWKHPHHWLQJ·Vparticipants gives more detail on the Feb. 9 meeting, led by 
Health Department. Minister Li Dequan.  The report attacks the Guomindang government 
for their silence and ineffectiveness when dealing with the effects of Japanese BW in China, 
and Li Dequan proclaimed her support for Soviet demands that Hirohito and other Japanese 
participants in the BW program be indicted and handed over to the proper authorities 
(USSR most likely).  While focusing on the evils RI-DSDQ·V%:SURJUDPWKHILQDOUHSRUW
really announces solidarity with the Soviet Union.48    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
47 Liu Shaoqi Wengao.  See also ´Discussion Notes On the Problem of Prosecuting Japanese BW War 
&ULPLQDOVµ0)$$UFKLYHV-00092-01, Feb. 9, 1950, 14 pages.   
 
48 105=00076-02, p. [15] Wen Jianfeng, Report on Participating Discussions at Meeting Convened by Central 
Health Ministry Regarding Japanese Biological Weapons War Crimes, Feb. 9, 1950. [⑙ࢁ仾´৲࣐ѝཞছ⭏
䜘ਜᔰޣҾᰕᵜᡈ⣟㓶㧼ᡈҹᓗ䈸ՊⲴᣕ੺µ@.  
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The February 9th meeting spurred mass meetings all across China to focus on the 
BW-Japan issue, and to support the Soviet suggestion, and by extension the Soviet 
Union. 49 
  In the days surrounding the Health Ministry meeting, the BW issue had achieved 
considerable prominence in the Chinese news media.  On February 11, the Renmin Ribao 
published a number of articles centering upon the existence of Japanese BW crimes in 
China.50  On February 12, the Renmin Ribao accelerated the theme, publishing another exposé 
on Japanese bacteriological warfare research in Manchuria, emphasized by a front page 
cartoon about Japanese BW crimes in southern China entitled ´3URWHFWLQJIUom Disease, 
Destroying the Rat.µ51  The cartoon showed a gauntly sick man prostrate in a hospital bed, 
UHSUHVHQWLQJ´=KHMLDQJ·V Wenzhou and Guangdong·V Liaohan and other areas after 
FRQWUDFWLQJPLFHSODJXHµ7KHLUVLFNQHVVKDVQRWEHHQVROYHGPDNing the cartoon a 
problematic representation of a weak China.  However, two men in white masks of 
indeterminate nationality (either Chinese or Russians) shoo away the dirty mice and one 
                                                 
49 MFA # 105-00076-02, p. [15] Wen Jianfeng, Report on Participating Discussions at Meeting Convened by 
Central Health Ministry Regarding Japanese Biological Weapons War Crimes, Feb. 9, 1950. [⑙ࢁ仾´৲࣐ѝ
ཞছ⭏䜘ਜᔰޣҾᰕᵜᡈ⣟㓶㧼ᡈҹᓗ䈸ՊⲴᣕ੺µ@. 
 
50 ´([SHUW&KHPLVW*LYHV9HUGLFW2UJDQL]DWLRQRI-DSDQHVH'HYLOVLQ&KDQJGH+XQDQ6SUHDG3HVWLOHQFHZLWK
WKH*RDORI6SUHDGLQJ%DFWHULRORJLFDOVLQWR$JULFXOWXUDO$UHDVµ´+HDOWK'HSDUWPHQW,QYLWHV([SHUWVWR*LYHD
Talk Verifying the 2FFXUUHQFHRI%LRORJLFDO:DUIDUH$FWVLQ&KLQDµRenmin Ribao, February 11, 1950.   
 
51 The cartoon was buttressed by adjacent articles by the Northeast Health Department (Dongbei Weishengbu) 
on prevention efforts and another on plague problems in the area RI3LQJIDQZKLFKKDGVHUYHGDV8QLW·V
base of operation. 
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immense rat from their sick patient.  This fanged rat, clad in Japanese clogs and Pu Yi-style 
VSHFWDFOHVFDUULHVWZREORRG\WHVWWXEHVKLVLPPHQVHKDLU\WDLOXQKRRNLQJIURPWKHSDWLHQW·V
bed.  If the two doctors are mysterious in origin, the cartoonist leaves no doubt about the 
leading rat, labeling it DV´-DSDQHVH(PSeror Hirohito and other BW war FULPLQDOVµOnly 
the wide reach of Chinese patriots and Soviet modernity could scare away the Japanese 
disease and bring balance to Chinese cities stunted by plague.  Such images also justified the 
importation of Soviet doctors into Chinese cities.  The main accompanying story in the 
Renmin Ribao on February 12 ZDVHQWLWOHG´5HFRUGVRI,QYHVWLJDWLRQRIBacteriological 
Weapons Factory Left by the Japanese Devils in Pingfan; Survey by Officials Zhong Lun 
DQG*XL/LDQµPhoto captions of Pingfan were juxtaposed with the triumphs of ´$XJXVW
15thµQRWLQJLQWKHFDSWLRQWKDW´$WWKHWLPHRI-DSDQHVHFDSLWXODWLRQWKH-DSDQHVHGXDO-use 
airplane bombed their own bacteriological ZHDSRQVIDFWRU\«7KLVLVIXUWKHUHYLGHQFHWR
show that Soviets were cRUUHFWLQWKHLUSURVHFXWLRQRIFULPHVDURXQG+DUELQµ1RWLQJWKDW
June 1946 had witnessed much death from rat-borne diseases in the area around Pingfang, 
the CCP pictured a dead body in a casket, mirroring almost precisely the layout of a famous 
picture of the Soviet-slain GMD engineer, Zhang Xinfu, in 1946.52  Simply, the source of 
&KLQD·VUDWSUREOHPFRXOGEHWUDFHGWR7RN\RDQGWKHLPSHULDOWKURQHYLD+DUELQ 
  When Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai signed the alliance in Moscow on February 14, 
1950, the PeoplH·V'DLO\published the alliance and related agreements immediately and in full 
                                                 
 
52 See China Weekly Review, Mar. 2, 1946; Susanne Pepper, Civil War in China, pp. 212-215. ; -LDQJ3HL´<LMLXVLMLX
QLDQFKXQIDQVX\XQGRQJVKXSLQJµLQ=KRQJKXDPLQJXRVKL[LQOXQ]KHQJ]KL]hongwai guanxi, renwu juan. 
>´&ULWLTXHRIWKH6SULQJ$QWL-6RYLHW0RYHPHQWµLQ1HZ7KHRU\RIWKH+LVWRU\RIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD
Politics, Foreign Relations, Personal] (Beijing: Xinzhi Sanlian shudian, 2003).    
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DQGWUXPSHWHGWKHEHQHILWVRIGHIHQVHDJDLQVW-DSDQ7KHWH[WRIWKHDOOLDQFHGHWHUUHG´WKH
revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any 
RWKHUVWDWHµWKDWPD\FROODERUDWHZLWK-DSDQ53  7KHWUHDW\·VFDOOIRUGHIHQVHDJDLQVW-DSDQ
vindicated popular opinion dissatisfied with the American occupation policies and skeptical 
of Soviet intentions.   
On this triumphant day, the Khabarovsk trials returned to the 3HRSOH·V'DLO\ and their 
discussion of Japanese human experiments.  Grisly imagery accompanied an article entitled 
´:H:HUH8VHGDV([SHULPHQWVIRU&ROG-:HDWKHU:RXQGVµ54  As the Soviet model 
pointed the way toward a future society based on communism, China was being encouraged 
to look back to the past, gathering evidence of Japanese crimes.  The Sino-Soviet Alliance, it 
was implied, would prevent further recurrence of such gruesome atrocities, yet it also gave 
the appearance that thHYHU\SRZHUZKLFKHQDEOHG&KLQD·VRSHQLQJSDWKWRPRGHUQLW\ZDV
unable to steer the country clear of the wounds of colonialism.  7KH$OOLDQFH·VHPSKDLVRQ
defense versus countries allied with Japan was noticed in the West, but the bacteriological 
weapons allegation gained little purchase.     
In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet alliance, BW rhetoric on the mainland would not 
slacken.  Public meetings would be held of workers and women, and a traveling exhibition 
of BW evidence would tour the country.   In the Northeast, debates would continue through 
DERXWWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH´IDFWRULHVRIGHDWKµZLWKWKHFRPPHPRUDWRUVRI%:FULPHV
winning a battle and keeping the site intact. 
                                                 
 
53 Renmin Ribao, Feb. 15, 1950.    
 
54 Renmin Ribao, Feb. 15, 1950.   
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Mobilizing Against BW after the Sino-Soviet Alliance 
 With the signing of the Sino-Soviet pact, the Soviet Union eased off for several 
months from its urging China to go public with Japanese atrocities.    However, the 
machinery of Chinese government had been primed to investigate and publicize, and as the 
government began to grow in confidence, these activities expanded rapidly.  The 
Khabarovsk trials stimulated a nationwide discourse on bacteriological weapons in China.  
Not only were local governments encouraged to collect as much evidence as possible of 
Japanese atrocities, the Central Ministry of Health actively took the propaganda campaign on 
WKHURDGSXEOLFL]LQJ-DSDQ·VFULPHVLQKRSHVRIVWLPXODWLQJPRUHUHSRUWV from local 
governments. 
 In the period just prior to and after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, the city 
of Beijing was the site of two large public meetings about Japanese BW atrocities.  The 
Health Ministry recorded the proceedings of these two rallies at the Temple of Heaven in 
the southern section of Beijing.  As a suspected site of Japanese BW use, the location was 
key to simultaneously establishing the veracity of Japanese BW crimes and the firm resolve 
not to see such crimes repeated.  The drive for public hygiene in the crowded city also 
played a role in the meetings.  On Jan. 14, 1950, a group of workers LQFOXGLQJPDQ\´female 
comradesµ gathered in the district for the meeting about Japanese BW where they were 
asked to describe the crimes.55  The evidence collected at the January 14, 1950 meeting was 
                                                 
 
55 MFA Document# 105-00092-06, ཙඋ䱢⯵༴ᐕӪᓗ䈸ᰕߋঐᦞᰦⲴᛵᖒᮤ⨶䇠ᖅˈTiantan 
IDQJELQJFKXJRQJUHQ]XRWDQ5LMXQ]KDQMXVKLGHTLQJVKLOLMLOX´5HFRUGRI7HPSOHRI+HDYHQ'LVHDVH
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fed to the Central Health Ministry which synthesized the allegations and passed them on to 
the Foreign Ministry for use in international propaganda.  These Beijing allegations were 
VXIILFLHQWO\LPSRUWDQWWREHSODFHGILUVWRQWKHDJHQGDIRUWKH+HDOWK0LQLVWU\·V)HEUXDU\
meeting.56  At the Foreign Ministry meeting of the same day, the results of the Temple of 
+HDYHQPHHWLQJVDUHFLWHGDVLQFRQWURYHUWLEOHHYLGHQFHRI-DSDQ·VSURGXFWLRQRI%:57  The 
second meeting at the Temple of Heaven district, on Feb. 16th, 1950, reinforced similar 
themes. 
 In their summary of the Khabarovsk trials, the State Council emphasized how the 
WULDOVKDG´YHULILHG-DSDQHVH(PSHURU+LURKLWR·VOHDGHUVKLSLQWKHIRUPHUUXOLQJFOLTXH·V
PDQ\\HDUVRIVHFUHWSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUEDFWHULRORJLFDOZDUIDUHµ,QDVOLJKWWZLVWRQSUHYLRXV
disFXVVLRQVWKH6WDWH&RXQFLOGHVFULEHGWKH-DSDQHVHDV´FRPSOHWHO\DQGEUXWDOO\LQ
violation of the laws and conventions of war, especially in relation to the June 17, 1925, 
*HQHYDWUHDW\SURKLELWLQJXVHRIEDFWHULRORJLFDOZHDSRQVµ7KHGRFXPHQWWKHQJRHs on to 
summarize the diplomatic results of the Khabarovsk trials, beginning with the Soviet note of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prevention Office Convening a Discussion of Workers about the Situation during the Period of Japanese 
0LOLWDU\2FFXSDWLRQµ0DUch 7. 1950. [pp. 8-9.]   
 
56 0HPRUDQGXPIURP+HDOWK0LQLVWU\WR)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\´&ROOHFWLRQRI(YLGHQFH([SHULHQFHRI-DSDQHVH
%LRORJLFDO:HDSRQV&ULPLQDO$FWLYLW\µһ⭡˖ᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼䇱ᦞ㓿䗷) , no date, MFA #105-
00076-02, ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ, p. 14.   
 
57 "Summary of Meeting Minutes for an Informal Discussion Concerning the Problem of 
Punishing/Prosecuting Japanese Biological War Criminals," ޣҾ᜙࣎ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟䰞仈ᓗ䈸Պ㓚㾱
1950.2.9, MFA # 105-00092-01, p. 13. 
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)HEUXDU\ZKLFK´VXJJHVWHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDVSHFLDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLOLWDU\WULEXQDO
ZKLFKZRXOGUHSRUWRQJXLOW\SHUVRQV·FULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\² and hand over Japanese 
(PSHURU+LURKLWRWRWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGFRXUWIRUWULDOµ7KH6WDWH&RXQFLOZDVDZDUH
however, that neither the U.S. nor Great Britain had responded to this rather radical request 
by the USSR.   
 Having set the international context, the State Council document turns to action 
within the PRC Central Government which had been prompted by these events.  The two 
primary meetings about BW were the Feb. 9 Health Ministry meeting; the other was a March 
3, 1950 meeting at the Foreign Ministry .  The State Council document sought to synthesize 
WKHUHVXOWVIURPWKHVHUHVSHFWLYHPHHWLQJVLQRUGHUWR´UHDFKFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKHPHDQVRI
KDQGOLQJDIHZPDWWHUVµ 
1. Using the [February 9th@IRUXP·VQDPHVHQGRXWDWHOHJUDPVXSSRUWLQJWKH
Soviet suggestion to have a trial for Japanese Emperor Hirohito and other 
guilty criminals.  This will simultaneously require heightened vigilance of the 
Chinese people and the people of the whole world against the murderous 
bacteriological weapons.  (This telegraph [can be] drafted by the Central 
Health Ministry.)      
 
2 .Combine [international] with domestic aspects to investigate the atrocities 
of the Japanese bacteriological war crimes in China.  This work can be done 
by related Ministries that will aid the Health Ministry in the collection of 
materials.  Past Health Ministry collections of [BW] materials have already 
scored great achievements; seen as propaganda materials, they have already 
had ample use.  Other offices can yet be engaged in helping from all sides.   
With regard to the courts, their most important mission is to, from the 
standpoint of laws, conduct research synthesizing the collected materials, 
producing analysis of that most powerful evidence.  
 
3. As to international propaganda work, this ought to be the responsibility of 
the Foreign Ministry.   
  
7KH6WDWH&RXQFLO·VSUHVFULSWLRQIRUIXrther work in propaganda indicates real awareness in 
the top echelons of the CCP toward the international implications of bringing forward 
atrocities of Japanese war criminals.  [further analysis]  ,QLWVFRQFOXGLQJ´VXPPDU\RI
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H[SHULHQFHµWKH6WDWH&RXQFLOODLGRXWDVHOI-criticism.  Several aspects are worthy of 
comment, but the most fascinating aspect of what follows is the idea of Soviet-inspired Chinese 
consciousness of Japanese war crimes.   
(3) Summary of Experience:  
1ˊIn the process of handling this task, we felt that our past attitudes toward 
the enemy conspiracies had been too common, that our knowledge of [these 
conspiracies] was still insufficient, that through our brother country of the 
Soviet Union taking the lead in advancing the problem of the bacteriological 
crimes, [we could realize] that in fact the Japanese had inflicted powerful 
injuries upon our people.  Now as a result of capable investigation we know 
how the Japanese in Beijing, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Datong and all other places 
cultivated the most powerfully virulent poisons.  This will cause us to 
heighten our spirit of vigilance against the invisible enemies [kanbujian de 
diren].   
 
2. We should again augment international propaganda work.  For instance, 
this case [of BW crimes] has connections of considerable importance.  Right 
now American imperialism is reviving Japan, and if we have a plan, we can 
expose to the Japanese people the despicable conduct of the blindly-
worshipped imperial system, using [this propaganda] to raise the 
consciousness of the Japanese people.  We must seize this time to expose the 
conspiracies of the Japanese invaders. 58   
                                                 
 
58 MFA # 105-00076-02, ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ, Feb. 9, 1950, p. 16-19. 
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In the aftermath of these public meetings, on March 7, the Beijing Temple of 
Heaven Epidemic Prevention Department had a meeting with nearly twenty people, most of 
ZKRPZHUHOHDGHUVDPRQJWKHFLW\·VODERUHUV7KH\UHYLHZHGLQGHWDLOWKH%:DFWLYLWLHVRI
the Japanese in the city of Beijing.  Although the document in the Foreign Ministry Archive 
does not indicate how this news was to be spread, it follows that factories would be the next 
step in the propagandization process.59    
A March 1950 exhibition explained more to mass people about the BW crimes.   The 
criticism, a summary of collective departmental impressions and criticism, is quite revealing.  
7KH\FULWLFL]HGWKHH[KLELWLRQDVODFNLQJLQGRFXPHQWDU\ULFKQHVVDV´unsystematic and 
somewhat messyµVKRZLQJWKDWWKHnascent [limited] reach of the propaganda apparatus in 
the period was hampering the campaign.  It also showed, more importantly, the half-
GHYHORSHGVWDWHRI&KLQD·VHYLGHQWLDU\FDVHDJDLQVW-DSDQ·V%:FULPHV² just as the nation 
was only now being pieced together, so was the puzzle of the BW experimentation in 
3LQJIDQDQGHOVHZKHUH7KHH[KLELWLRQ·VGLVFRXUVHRQDVFLHQWLILFOHYHODOVRZDVWURXEOLQJWR
WKHDGPLQLVWUDWRUZKRVDZWKH´explanations of the spread and harm of plague and the 
infectivity of the various bacteriaµDVEHLQJLQDGHquate and the statistics too few.  The lack of 
statistics and scientific lingo likely resulted from the lack of technical training among the 
propagandists.  However, it is just as likely that a populace largely removed from scientific 
terminology of the educated elite would have found a difficult time digesting such an exhibit 
when many schools were just reopening after years of dislocation and warfare.  Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
59 "୍஑஬஧ᖺ⌓⏕ᕤస⿣乻㉍࿌" [a report summarizing the hygiene work during the year 1952], ໭ிᕷ
ᨻᱟ᱌㸪୰ᅜ [Beijing Municipal Archives, China] 
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critiques of the exhibit reinforce the political intent of the exhibit ² its purpose was not so 
much to demand justice from Japan, but to point out how the Soviet Union disciplined 
WKRVH%:FULPLQDOVLQLWVFXVWRG\LQGLUHFWFRQWUDVWWRWKRVH´set free by the American 
Imperialismµ Yet, if the exhibition served its purpose of allowing the Chinese people to 
´H[SHULHQFH-DSDQHVHEDFWHULDZDUFULPLQDOV·VODXJKWHULQSHUVRQµLWZRXOGLQGHHGVWLPXODWH
´greater hatred towards war criminals.µ With a few minor adjustments, administrators noted, 
the exhibition could be expanded to cities across China.60  In April 1950, the exhibition 
moved to Hunan, where it met with more criticism from provincial party bureaucracies on 
similar grounds.  The Foreign Ministry fielded the complaints, but the exhibition continued 
on its swing through the south. 61     
 As the exhibition was stimulating public consciousness RI-DSDQ·VFULPHV, internal 
debates continued over the best means of handling an ongoing commemoration of, and 
research about, the crimes of Unit 731.  The major players here were the Northeast Industry 
Committee and the Northeast Weishengbu.  In discussions, Weishingbu showed their 
sincere interest in preventing future outbreaks of plague and other diseases hatched from 
,VKLL·VWHVWWXEHV.  However, industrialization came to a fascinating point of conflict with the 
process of popular memory.   In spring 1950, the Harbin Weishengbu received a note from 
                                                 
 
60 MFA Document # 105-00076-02ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ; [p. 51] Human Affairs Office [Ӫ
һ༴@WR)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\UHJDUGLQJ´$)HZ2SLQLRQVDIWHU2XU0LQLVWU\$WWHQGHGWKH¶(YLGHQFHRI-DSDQHVH
%LRORJLFDO:DU&ULPHV7HVWLPRQLDO([KLELWLRQ·µ0DUFK 
 
61 105-00076-02ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ; [p. 50] April 8, 1950 
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the Asian division of the Foreign Ministry relaying a debate that had been ongoing between 
WKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\DQGWKH1RUWKHDVW3HRSOH·V*RYHUQPHQW:HLVKHQJEu (the supervisors 
of the Harbin unit).  The debate centered around the future of the Unit 731 facilities at 
Pingfan, south of Harbin.62   
 On August 8, as China began to mobilize for the Korean War, a national exhibition 
occurred in Beijing on the anti-BW WKHPH0HL5X·DRZKRKDGUHSUHVHQWHG&KLQDDWWKH
7RN\R7ULDOVDQGDSURPLQHQW´WKLUGSDUW\µYRLFHVHQWDQRWHWRWKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\DERXW
the exhibition.   0HL5X·DRZDVEHVWNQRZQIRUKDYLQJUHSUHVHQWHGWKH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDDW
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo.[repeats]  As one of the most 
prominent men of the Republican period to be involved in the justice of Japanese war 
criminals, his involvement in the anti-BW campaign could be quite useful, both 
internationally and domestically.  On the international level, Mei could be seen as 
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKH35&·VOLQNVWRWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKH7RN\R7ULDOV, an ongoing goal of Zhou 
Enlai·VZKLFKKHKDGLQLWLDOO\H[SUHVVHGLQKLV)HEUXDU\QRWHWR=KRX(QODL'omestically, 
Mei was SUHFLVHO\WKHW\SHRIFXOWLYDWHG´PLGGOHIRUFHµRILQWHOOHFWXDOWKDWWKH3DUW\ZDV
wooing with anti-Japanese nationalism in the transitional year after taking power.  Mei, 
perhaps trying to curry political favor with the new administration, noted how pleased he 
was with the exhibition.  From his standpoint of international law, however, Mei suggested 
                                                 
62 Asian Division of Waijiaobu to Harbin Weishengbu, Foreign Ministry Archives, File # 105-00076-02, pp. 84-
85.  See also MFA #105-00107-01.   
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FU\SWLFDOO\WKDWWKHH[KLELWLRQZRXOGQRWFDXVHDGLSORPDWLFLQFLGHQWRU´international 
entanglementµ.63 
 With reference to the exhibition, Li Dequan·VQRWH to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Hanfu, and 
Vice Foreign Minister Li stated that ´3LHFHVRIHYLGHQFHIURPWKHH[KLELWLRQFDQEHRIXVHLQ
the meeting on foreign affairs policy.µ7KH´close attention[᝾䟽@µthat Li recommended 
was accepted immediately by the Foreign Affairs bureaucracy.  Accordingly, Vice Foreign 
Minister Wang adds that the Asian Affairs (Pacific Department) office would send a person 
to participate in the meeting/exhibitionDJUHHLQJZLWK/L·VFRPPHQWWKDWWKHH[KLELWLRQ·V
concern with foreign policy (that is to say, foreign propaganda) merited Foreign Ministry 
input.64  Individuals contributed articles relaying their first-hand accounts of Unit 731 
atrocities.  The Weishengbu were extremely active in soliciting these pieces.  More than 
simply putting their ideas into print, the Weishengbu reached ever-wider audiences in the 
spring of 1950 by organizing community meetings to discuss the meaning of the BW 
atrocities, the need to prevent future outbreaks, and promote patriotic education. 
 
Conclusion 
 Maybe [fewer maybes] the mobilization around the Khabarovsk Trials and Japanese 
BW began as a PR campaign for the Sino-Soviet alliance, but (especially considering later 
events) it seems to have expanded even in the two months after the trials.  Maybe the CCP 
                                                 
63 MFA #105-00076-02, p. 52, 0HL5X·DR´/HWWHU5HJDUGLQJ1DWLRQDO6DQLWDWLRQ([KLELW¶%LRORJLFDO:DU
&ULPLQDOV·µ$XJXVW 
   
64 Li Dequan, regarding Exhibition of Japanese Biological War Crimes Evidence, MFA Document# 105-
00076-02, ޣҾᩌ䳶ᰕᵜ㓶㧼ᡈ⣟㖚㹼Ⲵᶀᯉ p. 53. 
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realized what a great mass mobilization campaign complaining about Japanese atrocities was 
to help to solidify public support for the new regime, not just the Sino-Soviet alliance.  The 
Khabarovsk trials and subsequent Soviet actions in February 1950 were not carried out with 
Chinese input, but they nevertheless stimulated public attention to, and vigorous internal 
debate about, the threat of Japanese bacteriolgocial weapons.  For the public, the news from 
Khabarovsk and the Soviet pledge thereafter to try Hirohito in an international court were a 
means through which Chinese patriotism could be linked to an ally whose past actions had 
not always been helpful to China.  Perhaps more importantly from the point of view of an 
analysis of the masses, the stimulation of anti-Japanese consciousness by the Soviets 
coincided with the advent of the 1950s and was entwined rapidly thereafter with the 
emerging PRC national identity and peculiar nationalism.  For the Chinese government, the 
Soviet actions brought new momentum to local health campaigns who sought to gather all 
available data about Japanese BW crimes on the mainland, and were a boon.  By the same 
token, the ongoing BW discourse went on unceasingly right up until the allegations against 
the US/UN forces of using BW on Manchuria and Korean battlefields in spring 1952, 
adding another Japanese element into the Cold War narrative.  The Soviet Union is long 
dead, but the seeds it planted in China and its evidence of Japanese BW are still eagerly 
watered by the CCP.  the Khabarovsk testimony is reprinted by the PLA Publishing House 
now, and sold in many state and private bookstores to Chinese readers today who are eager 
to learn more aspects of Japanese BW research program in China.  A purely historical 
analysis of the outgrowth of the Khabarovsk trials would indicate that caution would be the 
best attitude with which to handle such a source.      
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